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Abstract: This article seeks to make sense of the policy debate on constitutional revision 
underway in Japan, to consider what international and domestic factors are driving the debate 
forward, to assess the range of proposals currently on the table, and to gauge the likelihood of actual 
constitutional change. Additionally, it considers how various forms of constitutional revision, if 
actually implemented, might affect Japan’s military doctrines and capabilities; the extent of its 
alliance cooperation with the United States; its devotion of military capabilities to UN operations; 
and the repercussions for Japan’s regional relations in East Asia. 
 
Since its promulgation in 1946, Japan’s constitution, and in particular its preamble 
and the article 9 “peace clause,” have occupied central positions in determining the 
direction of Japanese security policy. The constitution is the origin of a range of 
prohibitions and anti-militaristic principles that constrain Japan’s use of military 
force for national security ends, limiting the military to defending only the state’s 
own territory. It also creates significant barriers to cooperation with the United 
States and with the wider international community. Although Japan’s constitution is 
not unique in its pacifistic sentiments, it is arguably unique among developed great 
powers for its emphasis on anti-militaristic and pacifist strictures.1  
 The constitution has long been the battleground between policymakers 
both within and outside Japan who wish to push Japan toward a more proactive, or 
“normal,” international military role and those opposed to this, who are concerned 
about the possible recrudescence of militarism. For the Social Democratic Party 
(SDPJ) and other opposition parties for most of the postwar years, preserving the 
constitution (goken) has been of paramount importance. Other policymakers, 
including what might be termed the mainstream, conservative pragmatists within the 
governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), have balked at the restrictions of the 
“U.S.-imposed” constitution but have seen some advantage in it as a means to argue 
 
1 For a comparison of article 9 with other states’ constitutions, see “Ima, Kokkai Giiin wa Donna 
Giron o Shite Iru Ka?,” Ekonomisuto Rinji Zokan, July 2004, p. 14. 
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for “credible incapacity” and to delimit Japan’s military commitments to the United 
States. Hence, they prefer incremental reinterpretation (kaishaku kaiken) of the 
constitution to nudge Japan toward a more proactive security role.2 For a range of 
other conservatives from the LDP, straight constitutional revision (kaiken) has been 
an essential long-term goal. The conservative revisionists share the conservative 
pragmatists’ dissatisfaction with the constitution, but perceive constitutional change 
as a prerequisite for a variety of reasons, including the desire to finally bring to a 
close the “postwar period” and constraints on Japan’s sovereignty and national 
dignity; to enhance Japan’s capacity to work with all the usual prerogatives of a 
sovereign state with the UN and the United States in military security; and to 
produce clearer constitutional guidelines on the use of force.  
 
The Latest Debate 
 
 The latest debate on constitutional revision originated in the early 1990s but 
intensified beginning in 2000, and especially since Junichiro Koizumi became prime 
minister in 2001 (which post he leaves in 2006). This current debate is more 
extensive and has gained more decisive momentum than preceding instances, thus 
hinting at the real possibility of the constitution’s revision for the first time in its 
sixty-year history. This momentum is generated by fundamental shifts in Japan’s 
international security environment and its ties with the United States, and also by 
seismic shifts in the structure of domestic politics. The LDP revisionists are now 
increasingly joined in their efforts by elements of the opposition Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ). The proposed changes cover the preamble, article 9, and the lifting 
of the prohibition on exercising the right of collective self-defense. All of the major 
parties have constitutional research committees drafting proposed revisions: the LDP 
released its draft revision in November 2005 and the opposition DPJ is set to release 
its own version in 2006. The House of Representatives and House of Councillors of 
the Japanese National Diet have conducted research committees on the matter since 
2000, releasing separate reports in 2005; and the LDP and DPJ, after attempts at 
submitting joint legislation, then submitted individually in May 2006 Diet bills to put 
in place the necessary national referendum procedures to enable constitutional 
revision.  
 The most cautious of the proposals for revision would recognize the 
current de facto incremental expansion of Japan’s individual military capabilities and 
U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation, and non-combat support for UN peacekeeping 
operations; the more radical would provide a new role for Japan to engage in full 
combat operations in U.S. and UN-led multinational coalitions. The proposals have 
raised expectations among U.S. policymakers who are keen to see a strengthened 
alliance, but also heightened apprehensions and criticism of Japan’s evolving defense 
posture among East Asian states such as South Korea and China.  
 
2 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan, 




The Preamble, Article 9, and collective self-defense 
 
 The constitution’s preamble states Japan’s ideals with regard to security: 
 
We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the 
high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve 
our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving 
peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international 
society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and 
slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that 
all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.   
 
Chapter 2 of article 9 of the constitution, “The Renunciation of War,” reads as 
follows: 
 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the 
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the 
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
     In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as 
well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of 
the state will not be recognized. [emphasis added] 
 
Original drafts of article 9 drawn up by the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers were intended to prohibit Japan not only from engaging in offensive warfare, 
but also from the use of force for national self-defense and from maintaining any 
military establishment. However, the final drafts left open the possibility of modest 
rearmament for Japan to preserve its own security.3 Amendments to article 9 made 
in the Diet during the passage of the constitution in 1946, introduced by Hitoshi 
Ashida, led to the insertion of the phrase, “in order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph.” This opened the way for an interpretation of the constitution 
allowing Japan to maintain military forces for other purposes as long as these were 
not designed as a means of aggressive war and settling international disputes. 
 In his first term as prime minister (1946–47), Shigeru Yoshida, overseeing 
the final passage of the constitution and seeking to end the Occupation by 
establishing Japan’s anti-militarist credentials, offered an original interpretation of 
article 9 as prohibiting both offensive war and the right of self-defense. But in his 
second premiership (1948–54), he began to back away from this interpretation, 
looking to conclude a security pact with the United States by offering it the use of 
Japanese bases. Now the government stated that renouncing war did not mean 
 
3 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II (London: Penguin Books, 
1999), pp. 360-61, 368, 394-96. 
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abandoning the right of self-defense.4 Since the 1950s Tokyo has interpreted article 
9 as permitting Japan, in line with its position as a sovereign state under the UN 
Charter, to exercise the right of individual national self-defense and to maintain the 
Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) for this purpose.  
 Following this interpretation, the government has pursued an “exclusively 
defense-oriented” policy and elaborated a number of other constitutional 
prohibitions on the exercise of military power, such as restricting the JSDF’s military 
capacity to the minimum necessary for self-defense; and rejecting most overseas 
JSDF deployments as exceeding the levels of force necessary for self-defense. 
 Most importantly, the government has banned exercising the right of 
collective self-defense. As a sovereign state, Japan possesses under article 51 of the 
UN Charter the inherent right of collective self-defense. Since 1954, though, Tokyo 
has taken the position that exercising this right would exceed the minimum 
necessary force for the purposes of self-defense and be unconstitutional. Japan does 
not regard JSDF support for military forces of other states as unconstitutional if 
these actions do not involve military combat, but simply logistical support such as 
transport, supply, maintenance, medical services, guard duty, and communications. 
Japanese policymakers contemplated exercising the right of collective self-defense 
during the early stages of the Cold War as a means to create a more equal 
relationship with the United States in security, but did not for fear of entanglement 
in overseas military operations.5  
 Japan’s exercise of military force has been governed also by a range of anti-
militaristic principles, many derived from the preamble and article 9 of the 
constitution, although they are not constitutionally binding. The most prominent of 
these are Japan’s pledge not to become a military great power; its Three Non-
Nuclear Principles of 1967 (to not produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons); 
restrictions on the exports of arms and military technology introduced in 1967 and 
1976; and the 1 percent GNP limit on defense expenditure introduced in 1976.  
 In fact, Tokyo has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to reinterpret the 
constitution in order to stretch Japan’s military security posture. Prime Minister 
Yoshida initiated this approach through the reversal of the interpretation on the ban 
on individual self-defense in the 1950s. The ban on exercising the right of collective 
self-defense was an innovation of Yoshida and the powerful bureaucrats of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau (CLB), who sought a means to legitimize establishing the 
JSDF for purposes of self-defense but barring its deployment on potentially 
dangerous missions overseas.6  
 Also, during the later stages of the Cold War, Tokyo took its first steps to 
further Japan’s integration into U.S. regional and global military strategy, such as 
 
4 Tetsuo Maeda and Shigeaki Iijima, eds., Kokkai Shingi Kara Boeiron o Yomidoku (Tokyo: Sanseido, 
2003), pp. 15-18. 
5 Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives?, p. 23.  
6 Richard J. Samuels, Politics, Security Policy and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau: Who Elected These 
Guys, Anyway? JPRI Working Paper, March 2004, at www.jpri.org. 
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assuming responsibility under the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense 
Cooperation to protect sea lines of communication up to 1,000 nautical miles from 
Japan. 7  For many these appeared as de facto acts of collective self-defense, but 
because Japan-U.S. security cooperation was mainly concentrated around Japan 
itself and designed to counter a mutual Soviet threat, Tokyo could justify these 
actions under the right of individual self-defense. Tokyo in this period also seriously 
eroded many of its own anti-militaristic principles. It is believed to have allowed the 
transit through Japanese ports of U.S. nuclear weapons; it removed the ban on the 
export of weapons technology exclusively for the United States; and it effectively 
breached the 1 percent limit on defense spending in 1986, although it has stayed at 
around 1 percent since then.  
 Hence, Japan’s policymakers have shown great ingenuity in reinterpreting 
the constitution around the margins in order to build up significant military 
capabilities and to strengthen alliance cooperation. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s 
it was becoming increasingly clear to Japan’s policymakers that they were facing a 
set of international strategic and domestic political circumstances that had them 
bumping up against the limits of constitutional reinterpretation; they needed to 
consider moves towards open revision.  
 
Drivers of the Revision Debate  
 
Global and regional security crises 
 
 Since the end of the Cold War Japan has faced cycles of global and regional 
insecurity that its policymakers have perceived as demanding a new set of responses 
and an enhanced role for the JSDF. Globally, the 1991 Gulf War presented Japan for 
the first time with demands to make a “human contribution” in support of the U.S.-
led war effort by deploying the JSDF to the Gulf as part of a multinational coalition. 
Since 9/11, Japan has once again been under growing pressure to deploy the JSDF 
overseas in support of the U.S.-led “war on terror”. Regionally, Japan has 
experienced the twin crises of the first North Korean nuclear crisis and the Taiwan 
Straits crisis between 1993 and 1996, a second North Korean nuclear crisis from 
2000 onwards, as well as the rise of China. For Japanese policymakers the lesson 
drawn from these crises has been the need to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance in 
order to strengthen its deterrence functions to deal with regional contingencies.  
 
Domestic political realignments 
 
 Japanese politics began a significant depolarization over security issues 
following the collapse of the LDP-dominated, 1955 political system, marked by the 
party’s temporary loss of power in 1993–94 and then its reentry into government 
 
7 Glenn D. Hook and Gavan McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution: Documents and Analysis 
(London: Routledge, 2001), p. 17. 
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from 1994 through a series of coalitions, the most lasting of which is with the 
Komeito (Clean Government Party) from 1999 to the present. The collapse of the 
1955 system reduced effective opposition from the Left to constitutional revision, 
signified especially by the SDPJ’s loss of its position as the main opposition party. 
The SDPJ did enter into an ill-fated coalition with the LDP from 1994–96, but at the 
price of abandoning its traditional opposition to the constitutionality of the JSDF 
and the U.S.-Japan security treaty. The represented not only the SDPJ’s self-
abdication as one of the principal political checks upon Japanese remilitarization, 
but also its disintegration as a force in the Diet, with its strength reduced by 2006 to 
eleven members. The SDPJ has found itself successively punished by an electorate 
that felt the party had sold out on its anti-militaristic principles or was no longer 
relevant in a changing security environment.  
 The SDPJ’s position as the main opposition party has been assumed by the 
DPJ, formed in 1996 by splinter groups from the SDPJ and smaller parties that had 
originally split from the LDP. The DPJ is broadly centrist in orientation and does 
contain an important rump of SDPJ and social progressive members. But the LDP 
heritage of many of its members, combined with the rise of a group of younger 
conservatives, means that it also has a propensity to converge with the LDP on 
issues of security policy and the need to consider constitutional revision.  
 The collapse of the 1955 system induced a similar depolarization process on 
the Right, within the LDP itself. Previous constitutional-revision attempts in the late 
1950s and early 1960s arguably foundered not so much on the socialist opposition, 
but on internal divisions between the LDP’s pragmatist and revisionist camps.8 Since 
the late 1990s, though, the pragmatists became progressively weaker and the 
revisionists, in the guise of Prime Minister Koizumi and his Yoshiro Mori faction 
associates, took effective control of the party. Koizumi contributed to the implosion 
of the formerly dominant Ryutaro Hashimoto faction and the retreat from the 
political scene of more “dovish” figures such as the former Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Hiromu Nonaka. Koizumi also ensured the marginalization of Koichi Kato, another 
former chief cabinet secretary and former leader of the Kiichi Miyazawa faction, the 
principal pragmatist faction tracing its lineage back to Prime Minister Yoshida.9 The 
consequence is that the governing party and government’s policy direction are 
increasingly dominated by revisionists such as Koizumi himself; Shinzo Abe, the 
current chief cabinet secretary and the grandson of Nobusuke Kishi, the architect of 
revision attempts in the 1950s and 1960s; Yasuo Fukuda, a former chief cabinet 
secretary and son of the revisionist Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda; Taro Aso, the 
current foreign minister and grandson of Yoshida; and Taku Yamazaki, a member 
of the arch-revisionist faction of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone.  
 
The Limits of Constitutional Reinterpretation 
 
8 Robert Ward, “The Commission on the Constitution,” The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 
1965, p. 422. 




 Japan’s government and opposition politicians are increasingly converging 
in their willingness to respond to new security challenges by adjusting constitutional 
restraints. Many of them feel that Tokyo’s response thus far to existing challenges, 
and especially its tradition of stretching constitutional interpretations, has been 
inadequate. The government attempted to respond to the 1991 Gulf War by 
submitting to the Diet a UN bill that would have enabled the deployment of a UN 
Peace Cooperation Corps composed of volunteer JSDF personnel to engage in non-
combat operations, but stiff opposition from the SDPJ and poor preparation scuttled 
the bill. The government was then obliged to underwrite the war financially with a 
contribution of $13 billion, derided by much of the international community as 
“checkbook diplomacy.”  
 In the run-up to and after that war, the LDP also considered other means to 
stretch the constitution to enable JSDF deployment. Ichiro Ozawa, then the LDP 
secretary-general, later leader of the Liberal Party, and now leader of the DPJ, has 
asserted all along that the JSDF could have been deployed to the Gulf and to similar 
contingencies for combat operations in line with the concept of “international 
security” or “collective security,” without the need for constitutional revision. 10  
Ozawa’s concept of collective security contrasts with collective self-defense: the 
latter is an inherent right under article 51 of the UN Charter, whereas the former 
derives from earlier articles of chapter 7 (especially article 43) which stress the 
exercise of force only if sanctioned by the UN and if for the purposes of collective 
retaliation by UN members against aggression. 11  Ozawa has argued that the 
constitution’s preamble, which obliges Japan to cooperate with the international 
community for the purposes of international stability, means that Japan can 
participate in any form of UN-sanctioned and UN-centered multilateral military 
activity without violating article 9.12  
 Japan was eventually forced to settle for a minimal “human contribution” in 
the form of the deployment of six Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers to 
the Gulf in April 1991, after the cessation of hostilities, on the grounds that clearing 
mines from sea lanes in peace time did not constitute the use of force. Ozawa 
established an LDP Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in International Security,13 
but its findings were largely marginalized as the government shifted its focus to 
passing the International Peace Cooperation Law of June 1992, enabling the 
 
10 Yoshitaka Sasaki, Umi o Wataru Jietai (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1992), pp. 13-17; Nobumasa 
Tanaka, Kempo Kyujo no Sengoshi (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2005), p. 135. 
11 Tomohito Shinoda, “Taigai Seisaku Kettei no Akuta Toshite no Ozawa Ichiro,” in Kohei 
Hashimoto, ed., Nihon Gaiko Seisaku Kettei Yoin (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 1999), p. 41. 
12 Akihiko Tanaka, “The Domestic Context: Japanese Politics and UN Peacekeeping,” in Selig S. 
Harrison and Masashi Nishihara, eds., UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives (New York: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), pp. 93-94. 
13 Shigenobu Tamura, Kempo to Anzen Hosho (Tokyo: Nansosha, 1993), pp. 101-135. 
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dispatch of the JSDF on limited non-combat UN peacekeeping operations, again in 
conformity with the strictures of article 9.  
 In responding to post–9/11 security threats, Japan has again been forced to 
stretch the constitution, again with mixed results. In October 2001 the Diet passed 
the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law, to permit deploying the JSDF to the Indian 
Ocean to provide non-combat support to U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. Unlike 
the United States’ NATO allies, Japan could not invoke the right of collective self-
defense to justify support for the campaign. It could have followed the United 
States in relying principally on the right of individual self-defense, but this might 
have mandated the constitutional use of force and an open-ended combat mission.  
 Instead, it preferred non-combat JSDF deployment, which invokes neither 
individual nor collective self-defense, but is predicated on UN resolutions. Japan has 
stressed UN resolutions that identify the 9/11 attacks on the United States as a 
threat to international peace and call on all UN members to combat terrorism. Japan 
linked this UN legitimacy to its own constitution to legitimize JSDF deployment by 
switching emphasis from article 9 to the preamble, the latter stating Japan’s 
obligation to work with international society for the preservation of peace. Japan 
thus used the preamble to argue that it should support the UN, as international 
society’s highest representative, and counter terrorism. It bridged UN resolutions, its 
constitution, and support for the United States by stressing that its support was not 
just for the United States, but for the whole international community. Japanese 
policymakers used a similar method to justify the passage of the Iraqi 
Reconstruction Law in July 2003, which has enabled JSDF deployment to Iraq on 
non-combat reconstruction missions since early 2004. Tokyo predicated the law on 
extant, if rather weak, UN resolutions; and in arguing for the constitutionality of 
JSDF dispatch in December 2003, President Koizumi chose to read out in support 
the preamble rather than article 9. 
 In utilizing these formulas for Indian Ocean and Iraq deployments, Tokyo 
has actually arrived back at a de facto type of collective security, close to Ozawa’s 
original conception. Policymakers managed to achieve many of their basic objectives 
through these constitutional reinterpretations, the Antiterrorism Special Measures 
Law, and the Iraqi Reconstruction Law. Japan was able to project a visible military 
presence in support of the United States, and in the case of the Indian Ocean to 
effect relatively rapid JSDF deployment. These first-ever JSDF deployments during 
ongoing conflicts expanded the geographical range of deployment and represented 
new mandates for the use of weapons to defend not only JSDF personnel but also 
U.S. servicemen and refugees. In contrast to its experience in the Gulf War, Japan 
has received important credit from Washington for these measures.  
 Moreover, by meticulously maintaining its ban on collective self-defense, 
Japan was able to continue to hedge around the degree of military support offered 
to the United States. Japan pledged only non-combat support and deployed the JSDF 
to effectively non-combat zones. Its legitimization of JSDF dispatch based on 
existing UN resolutions provided it with a potential opt-out clause from conflicts 
that it viewed as insufficiently supported by the UN. In addition, the use of separate 
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laws for each deployment erected firewalls around each mission, enabling the 
government to simultaneously push forward, but also limit on a case-by-case basis, 
the support that it provides to the United States, and to potentially distinguish the 
support Japan provides to the United States in the “war on terror” from the support 
it offers under the bilateral security treaty.  
 Nevertheless, policymakers see serious drawbacks to this constitutional 
reinterpretation approach. The attempt to circumvent the ban on exercising the 
right of collective self-defense through the Antiterrorism Special Measures Law and 
Iraqi Reconstruction Law is seen to have imposed cumbersome operational 
restrictions on JSDF cooperation with other states to respond to terrorism. 
Furthermore, the de facto collective security option, although opening up the 
possibility of a hard-edged military combat role for the JSDF, is not one that can be 
explicitly explored as the principal basis of Japan’s international security role, 
because it is UN-centered. Japan could continue to exploit UN legitimization to 
provide support for the United States, but further pushing the linkages between the 
UN and its own security policy might set up tensions with Washington’s 
disinclination to allow the UN to constrain its own and its allies’ actions. Hence, in 
cases where no UN resolutions exist, Japan’s collective-security option might lead to 
inaction in support of its ally. Moreover, the government’s approach to JSDF 
deployment in the “war on terror” has drawn criticism from some both within the 
LDP and in the opposition parties who see it as stretching the constitution and 
leading Japan into potentially hazardous conflict situations in support of the United 
States.  
 Likewise, Japan’s experience of regional security crises in the years between 
the Gulf War and 9/11 further drove home for its policymakers the growing 
inadequacies of constitutional interpretation alone as a means to respond to existing 
threats. Japan failed to respond to U.S. requests for logistical support in the event of 
a conflict during the run-up to the first North Korea nuclear crisis, its hesitancy the 
product of long-held anxiety over entanglement in a U.S.-led conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula, the prohibition on collective self-defense, and the consequent lack of 
planning under the 1978 Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines for regional contingencies. 
This exposed the essential inoperability and emptiness of the alliance. In the wake of 
the crisis, Japanese policymakers sought to shore up the alliance by revising the 
Guidelines, a response once again involving skillful constitutional interpretation. By 
revising the Defense Guidelines in 1997 and then in May 1999 passing the Regional 
Contingency Law, Tokyo was able to fill in the alliance’s operability gaps, specifying 
for the first time the range of non-combat, rear-area logistical support it could 
provide to the United States under article 6 of the security treaty in the event of 
regional contingencies.  
 Tokyo countered accusations of the potential exercise of collective self-
defense in support of the United States with constitutional hair-splitting and 
linguistic artifices. For instance, it insisted that it was possible even in the thick of a 
regional military conflict to fix a line between combat zones involving U.S. 
deployments and non-combat zones for JSDF logistical deployments in support of 
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the US, and thus that there was no risk of the JSDF becoming sucked into the 
exercise of collective self-defense.  
 Stretching its constitutional interpretations has enabled Tokyo to expand 
the range of non-combat support that it can offer to the United States, while 
retaining its constitutional prohibition as a hedge against unnecessary entanglement 
in regional conflicts, especially over Taiwan. Nonetheless, its tactics have 
encountered criticisms similar to those ranged against JSDF deployment to the 
Indian Ocean and Afghanistan. On the one hand, the Regional Contingency Law is 
seen to have created operational guidelines for the JSDF that may be overly 
restrictive in actual combat situations, hampering effective U.S.-Japan alliance 
cooperation and jeopardizing Japan’s ability to defend itself against threats involving 
North Korea and China. On the other hand, Tokyo is again seen to have subverted 
the constitution in the name of prioritizing alliance cooperation with the United 
States and in order to bypass open democratic debate concerning the country’s 
strategic interests in the region and vis-à-vis the United States.  
 Finally, Japanese policymakers have to consider escalating demands from 
their U.S. counterparts for expanded alliance cooperation on a regional and now 
global scale. The clear intention of U.S. military strategy under the Bush 
administration has been to activate U.S. regional bases and alliances for global 
security functions. 14  Japan has in part responded to these expectations through 
engaging in the bilateral Defense Policy Review Initiative since 2004 and discussing 
the realignment of U.S. bases in Japan and enhanced bilateral cooperation. In line 
with that Initiative, Tokyo has agreed to relocate the headquarters of U.S. Army I 
Corps, a rapid-reaction force for deployment in East Asia and beyond, to Camp 
Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture and to locate its own newly established rapid-reaction 
Ground Self-Defense Force alongside it. In addition, as a step toward introducing a 
ballistic missile defense system, Tokyo has agreed to establish a joint U.S.-Japan air 
defense command base at Yokota in order to share sensor information. These 
military alignments place significant pressure on Japan’s existing prohibition on 
collective self-defense. Indeed, Japan’s deployment of a BMD system may be the 
military change that finally forces policymakers to breach the ban on exercising the 
right of collective self-defense.  
 In acquiring BMD, Japan will acquire a weapons system fully interoperable 
with U.S. assets, perhaps leading to enhanced demands for Japan to deploy these in 
multinational coalitions outside its own territory and in combat situations. Moreover, 
in order to operate BMD effectively, it will need to rely on U.S. infrared early-
warning satellite information and to construct an architecture allowing for the flow 
of information between U.S. and Japanese command-and-control systems. This can 
only create further pressure for constitutional revision and lifting the ban on 
collective self-defence.  
 
14 See its National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy of 2005, the Quadrennial Defense 
Reviews of 2001 and 2006, and the ongoing Global Posture Review. 
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 Tokyo is unlikely to receive from Washington relief from the pressure to 
reconsider its constitutional prohibitions. Since Richard Nixon’s infamous reference 
to article 9 as a “mistake” when visiting Tokyo as vice president in 1953, U.S. 
policymakers have exerted varying degrees of indirect pressure on Japanese thinking 
over its constitution. 15  The Armitage Report of 2000 stated that “Japan’s 
prohibition against collective self-defense is a constraint on alliance cooperation. 
Lifting this prohibition would allow for closer and more efficient security 
cooperation,”16 and in 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that article 9 was 
a potential obstacle for Japan’s bid to obtain a permanent UN Security Council 
seat.17
 In the words of one LDP policymaker at the time of the Antiterrorism Law 
debate, Masazuki Gotoda, the constitution has been stretched like an “elastic band” 
to breaking point. 18  Many Japanese policymakers believe that the time has now 
arrived for a full debate on constitutional revision in order to put Japan’s security in 
order, be it to free up or impose new restrictions on JSDF activities.  
 
Proposals for Japanese Constitutional Revision 
 
 Japanese political party proposals for constitutional revision are diverse, but 
as will be indicated below, have coalesced around three key issues and two potential 




 The LDP has long advocated constitutional revision as part of its platform, 
and its interest in actually implementing revision gathered momentum under Prime 
Minister Koizumi. In 2004, its Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) issued a 
report recommending amendment of article 9 to recognize the JSDF as a national 
armed force responsible for national territorial defense and the support of 
international security and to assert clearly the rights of both individual and collective 
self-defense. In addition, it recommended passing a Basic Law for National Defense 
and general law governing international peace cooperation activities that would 
replace the practice of passing ad hoc legislation to cover individual JSDF missions, to 
enable Japan to respond more readily to international contingencies. 19  PARC’s 
Research Commission on the Constitution in June 2004 produced its own initial 
debating points on constitutional revision, including lifting the ban on collective 
 
15 Hook and McCormack, Japan’s Contested Constitution, p. 14. 
16 Institute for National Strategic Studies, The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature 
Partnership, INSS Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2000). 
17 “Article 9 a UNSC Bid Hurdle: Powell,” Japan Times Online, Aug 14, 2004. 
18 Asahi Shimbun Yukan, Oct. 5, 2001, p. 17. 
19 Defense Policy Studies Subcommittee, National Defense Division, Policy Research Council, 
Liberal Democratic Party, Recommendations on Japan’s New Defense Policy—Towards a Safer and More Secure 
Japan and the World, March 30, 2004, pp. 8-9,  at www.jimin.jp. 
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self-defense.20 In January 2005 the party’s new Constitution Drafting Committee 
assumed responsibility for taking the process forward. It published its final draft 
revision in November, to coincide with the fiftieth anniversary of the LDP’s 
founding. The committee was largely dominated by the party’s revisionist sections, 
with Koizumi ally and faction boss Mori acting as chairman and Fukuda and 
Nakasone chairing the subcommittees on article 9 and the preamble, respectively.  
 The revisionist stamp on these early proposals was seen in, for instance, 
stating the duty of citizens to defend the country.21 However, mindful of the need 
to placate the party’s pragmatists and coalition partner Komeito, the committee 
took care to finesse the language. Most controversial within the LDP was the issue of 
the form and extent of the lifting of the collective self-defense prohibition.22 Aso, 
for instance, prefers straight constitutional revision to incorporate this right, while 
Abe prefers a change of the CLB interpretation.23 Others such as Yamasaki prefer a 
more limited form of collective self-defense exercised only within Japan’s own 
region or in cases of attack upon the United States; while some prominent 
pragmatists, such as Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki, a member of the Kato 
faction, remain cautious on the whole matter.24
 The LDP’s November 2005 draft plan identified three key points upon 
which intra-party consensus can be reached. Chapter 2 would be renamed from 
“renunciation of war” to “security”; its first paragraph and its pacifist principles 
would be retained. The sentence Ashida inserted, beginning “in order to,” is 
removed, and major changes are made to the second paragraph. First, the JSDF’s 
existence is recognized and its name changed to Self-Defense Military (Jieigun). 
Second, the military is specifically charged with international cooperation for the 
preservation of peace and security. This change is reinforced by the revised 
preamble, which pledges the Japanese people to cooperate for the preservation of 
international peace. 25  The collective self-defense issue is not addressed through 
constitutional revision; rather, the LDP plans to submit to the Diet a separate Basic 
National Security Law specifying the right and particular conditions for the exercise 
of collective self-defense.26
 The LDP appears to believe that it can effect this change because of the 
subtle modification in the status of the JSDF in its revised Article 9. It can argue 
that by establishing in the revised Constitution the principle of Japan’s possession of 
a military (gun) with international security responsibilities, rather than just a force 
designed for individual self-defense per se, and by setting this alongside the 
established principle of Japan’s inherent possession of the right of  collective self-
defense, then it is only natural for Japan in the bill for the Basic National Security 
 
20 “Futsu no Kuni Meikaku Ni,” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 5, 2004, p. 2.  
21 Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives?, p. 56. 
22 “Jimin, Minshu Mizo Umarazu,” Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 2005, p. 4. 
23 “Kawaru Kempo Rongi,” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2006, p. 11. 
24 “Kagi Nigiru Posuto Koizumi Sedai,” Asahi Shimbun, June 2005, p. 3.  
25 Jiyu Minshuto, Shinkempo Hoan, pp. 2, 4-5, at www.jimin.jp. 
26 “Jimin Shinkempo Kiso Yoko,” Asahi Shimbun, April 5, 2005.  
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Law to breach its self-imposed ban to exercise this right and to use its military 
forces to support its U.S. ally and the international community.27 LDP policymakers 
also draw confidence that this legislative and reinterpretative package can be pushed 
through because the drafting of the bill will enable the party and its coalition 
partners to negotiate acceptable geographical and functional limits on the extent of 
collective self-defense; because of the increasing ability of the executive office under 
Koizumi’s strong leadership to override CLB interpretations; and because the 
legislative bill will only require a simple majority in the Diet rather than the two-
thirds majority required for constitutional revision.28 The irony is that the LDP is 
looking to push through collective self-defense by revising article 9 but also mixed 
with a substantial amount of reinterpretation, thus employing the same sleight-of-
hand tactics that have traditionally been anathema to the revisionists.  
 
Democratic Party of Japan 
 
 The DPJ has experienced greater difficulty in developing an intra-party 
consensus on the form of revision and how to position itself as the main opposition 
party on this issue. It initiated its own Research Committee on the Constitution in 
1999, which produced a final proposal in October 2005. The DPJ intends to 
produce its draft version of a new constitution in 2006. Its basic position is 
conceptualized as constitutional “augmentation” (soken). Influential figures from all 
wings of the party are disturbed by what they perceive as the hollowing out of the 
constitution’s principles by endless government reinterpretations. Instead, the DPJ 
aims to reaugment the constitution’s fundamental pacifist principles and clearly 
demarcate the use of military force for individual self-defense and in support of the 
United States, while at the same time expanding Japan’s scope for international 
security cooperation with the wider East Asian regional community and the UN.  
 Internal factionalism has hindered consensus-building. The SDPJ rump led 
by Takahiro Yokomichi opposes revision in general and especially any moves to 
permit collective self-defense. Ichiro Ozawa has made common cause with 
Yokomichi on this position, arguing that constitutional revision is unnecessary for 
Japan to play an international security role. Ozawa and Yokomichi have jointly 
argued that Japan should avoid any move to constitutional revision that would only 
enable the LDP to further expand support for the United States, and that instead 
Japan should support the establishment of a UN standing army with JSDF 
participation.29 The social progressives in the party, led by the former DPJ President 
Naoto Kan, are more open to revision, but also propose establishing a special 
reserve force, separate from the JSDF, for overseas operations.30 They clearly intend 
to expand the scope for Japanese international security cooperation, but to do this 
in a means divorced from, and therefore capping the future potential extent of, 
JSDF deployment overseas in support of U.S. military operations.  
 
27 “Jieitai o Dō Suru Kanzen Shimurēshon,” AERA, August 5, 2004, p. 19. 
28 Samuels, Politics, Security Policy and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau, pp. 7-12.  
29 “Minshu Anzen Hosho no Kabe,” Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 2004, p. 4.  
30 “DPJ Set to Submit Own Proposals on Constitution,” Japan Times Online, January 14, 2004. 
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 On the other more liberal or conservative-leaning wings of the DPJ there is 
a greater appetite for constitutional revision and the possible exercise of collective 
self-defense. The former leader Yukio Hatoyama has advocated a limited form of 
collective self-defense.31 Another former leader Katsuya Okada caused controversy 
within the party when he argued in a speech in the United States in July 2004 that 
based on clear UN resolutions, Japan could actually use military force to contribute 
to international security, although this definition was closer to collective security.32 
Seiji Maehara, succeeding Okada until his replacement by Ozawa in April 2006, has 
stated that Japan should investigate, based on constitutional revision, the exercise of 
collective self-defense and be entitled to use military force in carefully limited 
circumstances such as regional contingencies and in UN-led operations.33  
 The DPJ has had to forge compromises in its proposals for constitutional 
revision. In a similar fashion to the LDP, it first proposed in 2004 that the existence 
of the JSDF and right of individual self-defense should be recognized in the 
constitution. Its second proposal also focused on specifying an international security 
role for the JSDF, but linked it more closely to the concept of collective security and 
UN operations.34 The DPJ’s third major proposal also resembled that of the LDP 
by seeking to create a Basic Security Law that would draw up specific restrictions on 




 Komeito’s position in coalition governments with the LDP since 1999 
provides it with considerable influence in this debate. The party produced its own 
points for debate in June 2004. Komeito’s basic position, determined in large part 
by its pacifist grassroots supporters, is one of constitutional “supplementation” 
(kaken). It seeks to essentially preserve the current constitution, but to add new 
features addressing the changing domestic and international environment, and thus 
contrasts with the DPJ’s plans for wholesale revision and expansion. Komeito has 
advocated retaining article 9 while recognizing the existence of the JSDF, the right 
of individual self-defense, and that the JSDF has an international security role. 
However, it has stated its opposition to any exercise of collective self-defense.36
 
Social Democratic Party of Japan, and Japan Communist Party 
 
 In contrast to the other parties, the SDPJ, recoiling from its experience of 
coalition government in the 1990s, has returned to its position of outright 
opposition to any constitutional revision. In February 2006, the SDPJ reversed its 
1994 recognition of the JSDF’s constitutionality and sought to convert the 1967 
 
31 “Minshu Riberarusei Kesshū,” Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 2006, p. 4.  
32 Katsuya Okada, “Atarashii Nihon to 21seiki no Nichibei Kankei”, at www.dpj.or.jp. 
33 “Maehara Backs Changing War-Renouncing Article 9,” Japan Times Online, October 18, 2005. 
34 “Minshu Riberarusei Kesshū,” Asahi Shimbun, February 8, 2006, p. 4. 
35  Minshutō Kempō Chosakai, Minshutō Kempō Teigen, October 31, 2005, pp. 15-16, at 
www.dpj.or.jp. 
36 Kōmeitō, Kōmeitō Kempō Chōsakai ni Yoru Ronten Seiri, June 17, 2004, at www.komei.or.jp.  
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Non-Nuclear Principles into binding law. It has been joined in its anti-revision 
stance by the Japan Communist Party. While declining support for both these 
parties in the Diet makes them unlikely to be able to influence the debate, they 
could hold the balance of power in any Diet vote. 
 
Convergence among diversity? 
 
 Diet opinion is clearly in favor of some form of revision. In April 2005 the 
House of Representatives reported a consensus that article 9 should be revised to 
acknowledge Japan’s right to self-defense and the constitutionality of the JSDF.37 
However, the House of Councillors failed to agree on specific revisions, and neither 
house was able to reach a consensus on revisions relating to the exercise of 
collective self-defense (although they both agreed that Japan should engage more 
actively in international security cooperation).38
 Japan’s principal business association, the Keidanren, produced its own 
report in 2005 proposing the recognition of the JSDF and the exercise of collective 
self-defense.39 Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan’s largest circulation newspaper, produced a 
draft constitution in 1994, urging the recognition of the JSDF and an international 
security role for Japan. The liberal magazine Sekai and newspaper Asahi Shimbun 
responded with their own proposals that advocated keeping article 9 intact but 
passing instead basic security laws that would provide an international security role 
for Japan, based on the creation of a special peace corps for non-combat 
humanitarian and developmental cooperation. Meanwhile, a number of civil society 
groups, including the Article 9 Association and Constitutional Pilgrimage 
Association, have intensified their opposition to constitutional revision.  
 According to a June 2004 poll, prior to the elections for the House of 
Councillors, 62 percent of all candidates favored constitutional revision.40 Another 
poll in July 2004 of 547 Diet members from both houses found that 64 percent 
favored specifying an international security role for the JSDF in a revised constitution 
and 55 percent favored collective self-defense.41  
 The public also appears to have tilted towards constitutional revision, with 
an Asahi Shimbun poll in May 2004 recording 53 percent of respondents in support 
of revision—the first time a majority was recorded since it began polling on the 
issue in 1995. Sixty percent of those polled still opposed revising article 9, but this 
was down 14 points from the last survey, in 2001.42  Another Asahi Shimbun poll in 
 
37 “Kyujo Kaisei Rongi Zenshin,” Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 2005, p. 2. 
38Shugiin Kempo Chosakai Hokokusho, April 15, 2005, at www.shugiin.go.jp; Sangiin Kempo Chosakai 
Hokokusho, April 2005, at www.sangiin.go.jp. 
39 Nihon Keizai Dantai Rengokai, Waga Kuni Kihon Mondai o Kangaeru: Kore Kara no Nihon o Tenbo 
Shite, January 18 2005, at www.keidanren.or.jp. 
40 “62% Running for Upper House Support Changing Constitution,” Japan Times Online, June 21, 
2004. 
41 “Kaikenron wa Kokusai Koken Shiko ni,” Ekonomisuto, Rinjizohan, July 12, 2004, pp. 4-5. 
42 “Public Gradually More accepting of Constitutional Change,” Japan Times Online, May 3, 2004. 
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May 2006 recorded over sixty percent in favour of revision to recognise the JSDF, 
with around forty percent for designating it as a military and for the exercise of 
collective self-defense; and, most tellingly, over sixty percent of the population 
under sixty years old supported revision, reflecting the generational shift in attitudes 
towards revision.43
 Hence, the parties and public alike increasingly accept the need for 
constitutional revision and agreement is beginning to converge on three focal issues: 
recognizing and the name of the JSDF as a military, defining the military’s 
international security role, and, most thorny of all, collective self-defense. These 
three issues will likely be fought out both by constitutional revision and by passing 
supplementary legislation such as a Basic National Security Law to tackle those 
issues that are deemed too controversial to include in the constitution.  
 
Scenarios for Attempting Constitutional Revision and Outcomes 
 
 1. Revision in line with the LDP model. The LDP’s position as the governing 
party and the dominance of its revisionist elements means that it carries the initiative 
in any constitutional revision, and that its draft is likely to form the principal basis of 
any final draft put before the Diet and public. If the LDP follows its preferred two-
stage process of constitutional revision accompanied by Diet legislation and 
reinterpretation, it will come close to success in its principal objectives. A broad 
consensus for its innocuous looking proposals to recognize the Self-Defense 
Military and its international role already exists in the Diet. Even if the DPJ 
recognizes the real intent behind designating the JSDF a military as a means to 
create a bridgehead to collective self-defense in the second stage of Diet legislation, 
the LDP may still be able to take enough of the DPJ with it, especially the younger 
liberals and conservatives around Maehara. Komeito will resist, but probably 
capitulate in return for compensation on its domestic political agenda and to keep its 
place in the government, and has shown a readiness in the past to compromise over 
controversial security legislation as with the Regional Contingency Law and the Iraqi 
Reconstruction Law. 
 If the LDP can confine the initial debate to recognition of the JSDF and its 
international security role, it may then form the necessary consensus among its own 
members and with Komeito to take a readymade two-thirds majority in the House 
of Representatives, and take another 30 or so votes with it from the DPJ and other 
parties in the House of Councillors. The LDP would then turn to tackling collective 
self-defense through a Diet bill for a Basic National Security Law. It could maintain 
its own internal consensus and Komeito’s support by building into the bill 
restrictions that limit the use of force to the East Asia region and exclusively in 
support of the United States, but then still manage to breach the ban on collective 
self-defense. It could also draw support from younger conservative elements of the 
DPJ grouped around Maehara, which have indicated that they intend to pursue the 
issue of collective self-defense through Diet legislation. Even if the LDP fails to 
 
43 “Kaiken Nijimu Genko Shiko,” Asahi Shimbun, May 3, 2006, p. 10. 
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pass this legislation the first time around, it can always attempt this again later, when 
the controversy has abated, having already established the necessary constitutional 
principles to open the way for reinterpretation.  
 2. Revision to recognize de facto realities. The second scenario is that 
constitutional revision occurs by a similar process to above, recognizing de facto 
realities, but with no move to breach the ban on collective security by Diet 
legislation. This scenario could arise as a result of splits within the LDP or in its 
coalition with Komeito over fears that anything more than the recognition of 
current realities would open the floodgates for collective self-defense 
reinterpretation. It would also occur if the DPJ maintains its solidarity in both 
Houses and opposes anything other than the recognition of de facto realities. This is 
likely if Ozawa retains his grip on the party leadership, due to the fact that, unlike 
his predecessor Maehara, he has determined to practice adversarial politics and not 
to offer cooperation with the LDP on constitutional revision—shown by the DPJ’s 
eventual decision to submit in May 2006 an independent bill for the constitutional 
referendum. Moreover, Ozawa may harbour hopes of drawing the Komeito away 
from the LDP coalition if he shows greater sympathy with their position on the 
constitution.  However, as with the first scenario, de facto recognition will still leave 
open the door to the LDP to seek to breach the ban on collective self-defense by 
reverting at a later date to its old tactic of simple reinterpretation.  
 3. Non-revision. A final scenario is the failure of even revision attempts 
limited to recognizing de facto realities. It might prove simply too complex to forge 
intraparty LDP and LDP-Komeito consensus, compounded by strong opposition 
from the DPJ. This could be especially so when any draft revision is subject to 
prolonged Diet and public scrutiny. Or, LDP plans might yet be undermined by the 
bureaucracy. The CLB could reassert its dominance on constitutional issues once 
Koizumi, who has the popular mandate to govern assertively, retires from the 
premiership.44 It may also be that revision plans are dragged down by a range of 
controversies over other, non-security related issues involved in revision. The LDP 
might be banking on bundling the security measures together with measures on 
human rights as a means to smooth revision with the public.45 On the other hand, 
the LDP draft contains many controversial areas relating to patriotism, the position 
of the emperor, and the media which may incite political and public opposition. 
Lastly, achieving even the 50 percent hurdle of public approval in any case will be 
mightily difficult. Hence, the possibility of failure is real. But even in this instance it 
will not totally shut off the LDP’s and government’s options to push forward 
Japan’s security role. They can always fall back on revision by reinterpretation, even 
if this method is providing diminishing returns. 
 
Implications for Japan’s Security Policy and International Relations 
 
 The scenarios presented above hold differing implications for Japan’s 
military role, its U.S. alliance, and its role in UN-centered military operations. If the 
 
44 Samuels, Politics, Security Policy and Japan’s Cabinet Legislation Bureau, pp. 7-8. 
45 Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives?, p. 55.  
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LDP plan is successful, Japan, with its right of collective self-defense established, will 
be able to engage in the full gamut of military operations, including its current 
participation in UN peacekeeping operations and in “coalitions of the willing” in 
Afghanistan and Iraq (Japan announcing in June 2006 its decision to “redeploy” the 
JSDF in Iraq, a euphemism for near total withdrawal), as well as an extension to 
partake in collective security and U.S.-led coalition operations. Although it may 
continue to limit collective self-defense to East Asia and in support of the United 
States, it will effectively become a “normal” military state.  
 If the second scenario, de facto recognition, is followed, this will enable Japan 
to continue to its current non-combat participation in UN and U.S. operations, and 
finally settle criticisms of these as unconstitutional, opening the way for its increased 
participation in these types of operations. However, Japanese policymakers will still 
be free to pursue the reinterpretation route to permit participation in a full range of 
operations. Thus revision in this form will be a way-station on Japan’s path toward 
assuming a “normal” military role, rather than placing any kind of long-term cap on 
the remilitarization of its security policy.  
 The third scenario, non-revision, would certainly slow down and possibly 
even reverse the current direction of Japan’s security policy. It would lead to the 
questioning of even current activities as against the spirit of the constitution and 
strengthen the constitution-preservation argument. It is less likely to halt 
participation in UN missions. Indeed, it may only temporarily slow Japan’s military 
path. Faced with the same pressures to pursue an enhanced military path, Japan 
could resort to reinterpretation once again to push forward its military role, even if 
at an even slower pace.  
 Japan’s developing military role will impact its key international relations in 
different ways. The LDP route would strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and provide 
new avenues for military cooperation, but the United States needs to be careful what 
it wishes for. While the LDP plan will create a more active ally, it will also release an 
ally from previous restrictions, conceivably empowering it to at last pursue a more 
independent security agenda from the United States.  
 In East Asia, clearly China and South Korea would be happier with the 
constitution continuing to bind Japan’s military power, exercised either 
independently or through the mechanism of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The LDP plan 
may be very hard for Japan’s Northeast Asian neighbors to live with. China has 
already criticized LDP plans, and in his independence anniversary speech in March 
2006, President Roh Moo Hyun echoed this criticism. 46  The result will be the 




 Japanese policymakers look set to move around yearend 2006 to begin to 
implement genuine attempts at constitutional revision. The changeover in power in 
2006 from Koizumi to possible successors such as Abe, Fukuda, Aso or Tanigaki 
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may impose a temporary slowdown on revision efforts. But the revision debate has 
decisive mid to longer term forward momentum due to the confluence of 
international and domestic pressures.  The status quo in security is no longer tenable 
with the rise of new threats and alliance demands. In addition, the traditional 
practice of reinterpretation has for many reached its limits. Many policymakers 
believe the constitution has to be revised, both to provide greater flexibility and also 
clearer guidelines for Japan’s security policy.  
 The major parties have reached a broad consensus on the importance of 
tackling three key issues: JSDF recognition, an international security role, and 
collective self-defense. The LDP as the governing party is seeking to push all three 
elements, via formal constitutional revision and Diet legislation involving 
reinterpretation. The LDP approach is the most likely scenario, provided that it can 
bring the Komeito and sections of the DPJ with it. However, simple de facto 
recognition of current realities or even non-revision are strong possibilities. Any of 
these scenarios will shape Japan’s range of military options and relations with the 
United States and East Asia. Indeed, Japan’s aspirations to assume the security 
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